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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant incorporates herein the statement of facts 
contained in the Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief") and 
challenges Appellee's factual statement insofar as it 
contradicts or differs from Appellant•s factual statement. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. 
The District Court's custody determinations were based 
on improper factors and its Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law seek to support its unsupportable judgment. 
The District Count's assessment of fault to the Appellant for 
the failed marriage, its disdain for women who pursue 
non-traditional interests, and its overwhelming distaste for 
marital infidelity by women were the actual, overriding, and 
improper reasons that Appellant was denied custody of her 
children. 
II. 
At one point after the divorce, Appellee relinquished 
custody of one of the minor children to Appellant. The 
District Court glossed over that fact and gave it no weight in 
its ruling on Appellant's petition seeking to gain custody of 
all of her children. The District Court also failed to address 
the factors upon which Appellant relied to establish changed 
circumstances. The court's bias against women was again 
evident in this process. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW SEEK TO JUSTIFY ITS ORDERS BY MINIMIZING THE 
IMPROPER FACTORS UPON WHICH THE ORDERS WERE ACTUALLY 
BASED. 
It is evident upon any examination of the transcript 
of the original divorce trial and the Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Supplemental Findings") that, 
while the District Court, on remand, attempted to establish 
justifiable grounds for its original custody order, the actual 
reasons for the court's actions were based upon factors which 
this Court has held are improper for consideration in a custody 
dispute. 
While there may be an evidentiary basis for some of 
the District Court's Supplemental Findings, it is not 
sufficient to justify the custody orders on appeal here when 
the obvious reason for those orders was the District Court's 
prejudice against women who pursue non-traditional interests. 
It is proper for this Court to to review the District 
Court's grounds for its original custody order because, on its 
first remand of this case, this Court ordered the District 
Court to supplement its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
with regard to its original order. This Court cannot 
adequately determine the validity and accuracy of the 
Supplemental Findings without considering the grounds for the 
original order by examining the trial transcript. 
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The District Court applied two different sets of 
standards to the parties in this action. The standards applied 
to Raymond rewarded him for working long hours in his business 
(R, T-2, p. 58, 61) while the standards applied to LaRae 
penalized her for her interests outside of the home. 
(Supplemental Finding, No.6) The District Court placed the 
blame for the parties1 failed marriage directly and solely on 
LaRae. (R, 238). It failed to consider that the marriage had, 
in all likelihood, failed before LaRae developed outside 
interests. It failed to address Raymond's sexual cruelty to 
LaRae. (R, T-3, p. 20.) Raymond shares in the responsibility 
for the marriage's failure. 
Contrary to Appellee's assertion that the recent case 
of Merriam vs. Merriam, 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (1990), addressed 
the issue of the District Court's bias against women, that 
issue is not addressed in the Court of Appeals' decision. 
Merriam, however, when examined in the context of the present 
case and Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987), 
reveals that the District Court apparently presents a no-win 
situation to women involved in custody disputes. In that case, 
the District Court also granted custody of a minor child to the 
father. One factor which the court found significant in its 
custody determination was that: 
The Defendant's financial capabilities are 
greater and more sound than that of the 
Plaintiff because Plaintiff lacks specific 
job related skills whereas Defendant has job 
related skills. 
-3-
Merriam at 34 (emphasis added). Poor Mrs. Merriam. If she had 
taken the steps necessary to obtain those "job related skills" 
she would have, alas, at the same time, "developed interests 
outside the home" and would have undoubtedly been denied 
custody for that reason. 
The Appellee also wrongly asserts that the present 
case is clearly distinguishable from Marchant, supra. In fact, 
the similarities between Marchant and the present case are 
glaring. In Marchant, the District Court's custody 
determination was based upon what it perceived to be the wife's 
"non-traditional activities" and, in effect, assessed her with 
the blame for the breakdown of the marriage despite its finding 
that the husband abused the wife both mentally and physically. 
The court also overly emphasized the wife's moral indiscretion 
committed, as in the present case, during the latter part of 
the marriage when the marriage had already begun to fall 
apart. This Court found in Marchant that these considerations 
were improper and reversed the District Court's Judgment. This 
Court should make the same finding in the present case. 
POINT II 
THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT IN 
HER PETITION TO MODIFY WERE NEVER GRANTED THE 
CONSIDERATION WHICH THEY DESERVE AND WHICH UTAH LAW 
REQUIRES THAT THEY RECEIVE. 
LaRae's Petition to modify the District Court's 
custody award relied, to a great extent, on her changed 
circumstances. The District Court failed to address in even 
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the most cursory manner the merit of those changes. In Elmer 
v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), the Court stated that: 
[W]e have held that a change in the 
circumstances of the noncustodial parent may 
bear upon the issue of whether a change of 
custody may be appropriate. (Citation 
omitted.) 
Elmer at 602. If LaRae's changed circumstances "may bear" on 
the issue, the District Court committed clear error when it 
failed to consider or address those circumstances. 
The District Court also ignored the implications of 
Raymond's attempt to permanently relinquish custody of the 
minor child, Josie, to LaRae's parents after he had already 
given custody of the child to LaRae. Appellee misstates the 
circumstances of that event in an effort to minimize its 
significance. The fact that Raymond was prepared to give up 
custody of Josie is significant and material to the custody 
issue. Tuckey v. Tuckey, 649 P.2d 88 (Utah 1982). Appellee 
would downplay this fact by maintaining, contrary to the 
evidence, that he gave up custody of Josie only after 
Savannah's tragic death when, in fact, he relinquished custody 
of the child prior to the date of the accident. (R, p. 241-
242) . 
The District Court also failed to take heed of the 
fact that Raymond gave up custody of Josie prior to Savannah's 
death and granted Raymond the benefit of the excuse which he so 
desperately needed for his relinquishment of custody, i.e., 
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that the time following Savannah's death was so stressful that 
Raymond could not cope with the young child. It should not be 
overlooked that LaRae, whose emotional stability Appellee so 
eagerly calls into doubt, was able to maintain her emotional 
stability and provide critical emotional support to the 
children under the very circumstances which Raymond maintains 
rendered him incapable of caring for the children. 
Finally, the significance of LaRae's changed 
circumstances must be re-emphasized. She has remarried and is 
enjoying a relationship that is stable both economically and 
emotionally. Appellee, and the District Court for that matter, 
downgrade the quality of that relationship by pointing out that 
LaRae is now married to Randy Thorpe who, the District Court 
asserts is Mthe guy she has the situation develop with. . . .w 
(R, T-2, p. 115). There was never any evidence presented to 
the Court that LaRae and Randy shared an intimate relationship 
at any time prior to the divorce. Even if the evidence had 
established that such a relationship existed, LaRae's 
subsequent marriage to Randy could only indicate that their 
relationship was based on much more than a common sexual 
interest. The marriage is stable and LaRae can provide a 
stable and nourishing environment for all of the children. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court presents women a no-win situation. 
If a woman pursues "outside interests," she will not be granted 
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custody of her children because she has not followed the 
traditional path of womanhood. If she does not develop 
marketable job-related skills outside of the home, she is less 
capable than her spouse to care for the material needs of her 
children and loses custody to the father for that reason. 
It also appears that all a father desiring custody 
need do to obtain custody is allege that the mother has been 
unfaithful (the ambiguous allegation that she was "involved" 
with another man is sufficient) during the marriage. The 
District Court will grant overwhelming weight to such an 
allegation while apparently overlooking, in its child custody 
determination, physical, emotional and sexual cruelty proven 
against the father. 
The District Court's Order on LaRae's Petition to 
Modify cannot be upheld because the court did not consider all 
of the changed circumstances which were relevant to a proper 
determination of the Petition. It also ignored the undisputed 
facts in order to find, contrary to law, that Raymond's 
relinquishment of Josie's custody was not relevant to the 
custody issue. The court apparently believed that LaRae's 
alleged emotional instability made her unsuitable to receive 
custody of the children and, at the same time, made excuses for 
Raymond's emotional instability. LaRae deserves a fair hearing 
on her Petition to Modify. She did not receive one below. 
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While women can no longer expect greater consideration 
in child custody cases, they certainly deserve equal 
consideration. The record in this case is clear. LaRae did 
not receive equal consideration because she faced an 
insurmountable obstacle, the moral indignation of the court. 
This court should overrule the District Court and grant the 
relief requested in Appellant's Brief. 
DATED this A } day of February, 1991. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By l'$\ l< ' 
Don R. Schow 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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